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The need for the EU to respond and position 
itself in the deepening geoeconomic 
competition between the Great Powers has 
initiated a policy reorientation that is slowly 
attempting to break down the barriers 
between economic and security concerns. 
But how can a more geoeconomic EU 
ensure an integrated approach to economic, 
technological and security policy that allows 
it both to manage new risks and also retain 
the principles of openness and cooperation?  
Getting a geoeconomic EU right will require 
a strategy which defines and operationalises 
the notion of ‘European economic 
sovereignty’. This would support the EU and 
Member States in managing the increasing 
tension between openness and protection in 
prospective policy. On that basis, a 
geoeconomic EU in 2020 could see it 
reinforcing resilience to economic coercion 
and strengthening its role in emerging 
technology-security governance and 
diplomacy. 
 
 
GEOECONOMIC FORCES 
The new Commission President von der Leyen’s 
by-now notorious declaration of a Geopolitical 
Commission could have also employed a more 
appropriate choice of words: a Geoeconomic 
European Union. This would appreciate three 
realities: (1) the centrality of the economic 
domain for power and security competition; (2) 
the EU’s economic power potential via regulation 
and its market; and (3) the Commission’s need to 
cooperate with Member States (MS) – as the EU 
– to develop European power.  
The return of Great Power competition has 
witnessed trade regulation and state intervention 
in the economy that is increasingly driven by 
geopolitical ambition and not strictly by market-
oriented calculus. For the centres of economic 
power in Beijing and Washington, the economic 
infrastructure (institutions, rules, standards, 
relations) is becoming the primary venue for 
competition. While they pursue a range of 
objectives, the issue of technological leadership – 
with its implications for national and economic 
security – has crystallised into the key 
battleground. 1    
The concept of geoeconomics does not only describe 
the use of economic instruments for geopolitical 
benefit (a statecraft)2 but also alludes to the 
transforming relationship between the state and 
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the market and between economics and security. 
China, for its part, employs an extensive 
industrial policy programme to support domestic 
innovation in strategic technology sectors and 
transfers (or otherwise acquires) foreign 
technology from competitors by various means. 
Beijing also makes extensive use of its economic 
statecraft to influence (or coerce) private and 
public actors to align with its political agenda 
while promoting its technology, standards and 
rules for global adoption (e.g., via the Belt and 
Road Initiative or BRI).3 The United States, 
meanwhile, increasingly restricts access to its 
technology and domestic market for political or 
security gains, tarnishes multilateral rules and 
structures, and (re-)elevates economic sanctions 
as a primary instrument to attain geopolitical 
goals.4    
The EU has so far struggled to adapt to this 
geoeconomic order.5 Should it? This is not a 
binary question. Yes, European interests are best 
governed by multilateral, rules-based and power-
cancelling legal structures. European interests are 
also most achievable when cooperating with 
other powers: the United States by default, other 
powers when interests converge.6 But when 
international structures, multilateral or bilateral, 
are crumbling, more assertive action in defence 
of EU interests becomes a second-best but 
necessary insurance policy.  
 
REGULATORY POWER 
That is not to say that the EU has been absent 
from geoeconomics. The power to shape third 
countries’ regulations (e.g., environmental or 
labour protections via trade agreements)7  and the 
operations of private firms (e.g., via technical 
standards requirements for access to the single 
market8 ) is well-documented (and notorious in 
some places). Beyond easing trade for business, 
this regulatory power can, under certain 
circumstances, produce beneficial geopolitical 
value.  
For example, data privacy rules under the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
may play a fundamental role in shaping how 
modern digital economies do business and 
protect the security of citizens. Third countries 
and firms may feel compelled to adopt similar 
standards of protection or else suffer restrictions 
on trading data across borders. With data as a 
critical enabling input in emerging technology 
such as artificial intelligence (AI), 9  its regulation 
– for which the EU, United States and China hold 
different views – has risen to strategic importance 
in the geoeconomic competition.  
In other words, the adoption of certain EU 
standards, voluntary or not, is an expression of 
the EU's power to shape a contested global order. 
This power might not only translate into strengthening 
Europe’s economic competitiveness (e.g., global 
adoption of EU car standards) but, ideally, also 
promote European values (e.g., standards 
regulating face-recognition technology; ethics of 
AI) and European security (e.g., 5G network 
standards). The GDPR’s data trade rules and 
other regulations can offer geopolitical benefit to 
the EU by producing spheres of influence, 
though not all standards are of strategic 
importance. Shaping the standards around 
sanitary treatment of bananas may be neat, but it 
hardly offers geopolitical benefit.  
The 2018 EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy – on paper, 
a comprehensive trade, investment, finance, 
development, infrastructure and foreign policy 
scheme – also offers this potential on paper: to 
compete with other powers (China’s BRI; 
Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union or EEU) not 
only for commercial gain (e.g., tapping into 
booming Asian markets) but also to set the digital 
and physical standards that shape development in 
Eurasia. In turn, this rulemaking offers avenues 
for promoting EU interests, values and security 
abroad. 
But the lack of explicit funding channelled 
through the Strategy is further complicated by an 
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unclear narrative and by the marginal attention 
the Strategy received beyond Brussels (not even 
reaching EU capitals). Scaling public and private 
investment to infrastructure projects is one thing. 
Unlocking their geoeconomic potential is 
another. The latter requires the definition of 
strategic objectives, political steer and 
engagement. For all the unease felt about China’s 
BRI in parts of Europe, there is much to learn 
from its public diplomacy. A geoeconomic EU 
should ensure that all actors adopt a political 
narrative of connectivity. Formulating this 
together with Tokyo (which itself has been 
mustering a multi-layered geoeconomic strategy 
as part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision) 
under their new connectivity partnership could 
help the EU strengthen this dimension. 
 
A GEOECONOMIC REORIENTATION 
While regulatory power can be a powerful tool to 
shape the international order, its greatest strength 
is also its weakness: it is based on market 
principles. With other powers pursuing 
geoeconomic action which seek to traverse or 
manipulate market logics (e.g., strategic 
investments, industrial policy, tariffs), plus 
Europe’s shrinking market and innovation base, 
the thrust of geoeconomics today has shifted to 
entangle economic, technology and security 
competition between Great Powers more 
broadly. A widening of the EU’s geoeconomic 
play is therefore necessary if the Union is to 
remain an economic power broker. The 2019 
EU-China Strategic Outlook communication 
partly acknowledged this turned-page by 
designating China as 'cooperation partner', 
'economic competitor' and 'systemic rival'. 
The EU investment screening legislation that 
entered into force last year stands among the first 
of these policy reorientations. It sent an 
important global signal that the EU 
acknowledges security risks associated with 
(mainly) China’s strategic investment strategy to 
acquire critical technology and infrastructure. 
The regulation provides for an EU framework for 
reviewing foreign investment on grounds of 
'security or public order' by offering coordination 
and cooperation mechanisms to MS – which 
remain responsible for review and blocking 
decisions.   
In addition to the mere advisory role for the 
Commission, however, the EU-consensus also 
failed to capture the economic security aspect of 
foreign investment, which could, for instance, 
consider investments' impact on innovation and 
productivity in strategic sectors (factors 
introduced by, e.g., Canada and Australia).10 
Ultimately, only an EU-level review tool able to 
consider EU-wide vulnerabilities to foreign 
investment can effectively respond to new 
security risks that traverse economic, technology 
and security concerns.  
The 5G/Huawei network saga, though far from 
settled, also indicates a slow reorientation. Yes, 
the canyon between economic (cost-efficiency; 
fear of retaliation) and security concerns (spying; 
loss of control; industrial policy) remains a 
significant hurdle to a strategic approach. But the 
EU managed to build some bridges. In a 2019 
EU-coordinated risk assessment report, MS 
agreed that both technical risks (e.g., ‘bad code’ 
in software) and political risks (e.g., 
overdependence; legal framework in 5G 
supplier’s home country) are critical factors for 
assessment, together creating a 'new security 
paradigm'. 
On that basis, the Commission’s recently 
published Toolbox of Risk Mitigating Measures 
offers national authorities a vast set of actions to 
manage this new security challenge. While MS 
have discretion as to how exactly they implement 
the policy (especially concerning the 
interpretation of political risk), the Commission 
toolbox tells a clear story: when assessing 'high-
risk vendors' such as Huawei, not only technical 
standards but also political factors demand 
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consideration (e.g., is that provider headquartered 
in a country with inseparable commercial and 
security activity; without adequate rule-of-law 
standards or with intrusive national security 
laws?). It provides MS with the opportunity to 
exclude high-risk vendors like Huawei. 
 
A GEOECONOMIC EU IN 2020: GETTING IT 
RIGHT 
These measures are a foot in the door for a 
geoeconomic EU. But Europe requires a more 
strategic approach to the mounting challenges at 
the intersection of economics, technology and 
security in the triangular relationship with 
Washington and Beijing. The big strategic task 
for Europe is not to regard these issues as isolated 
events. The structural changes in the 
international order require an overarching 
reorientation towards the other powers and 
towards the tools that are necessary for defending 
European interests.  
This reorientation of EU geoeconomic policy is 
captured by the notion of European economic 
sovereignty, building on President Macron’s 2018 
call for European sovereignty11 and its different 
echoes (digital, technological, economic, defence) 
in Brussels and beyond. But its operationalisation 
remains scattered. Without a strategic frame, the 
risk of uncoordinated, antagonistic policies is 
even higher than is already the case.  
In 2020, a new edition of the EU Global 
Strategy12 could, for instance, develop this 
concept as a sub-strategy – part of a wider Grand 
Strategy that positions Europe in the Great 
Power competition. Cooperation and push-back, 
with both Beijing and Washington, can and 
should co-exist. The strategic direction, of 
course, must not be decoupling, nor trading in 
growth and innovation for unrealistic sovereignty 
objectives. Understanding the second- and third-
order effects remains a critical exercise when 
operationalising economic sovereignty, e.g.: 
What are the costs/benefits of restrictive trade 
and investment measures on long-term EU 
economic growth and innovation? What are the 
diplomatic costs/benefits of more assertive 
action?  
Ultimately, Europe’s economic sovereignty is 
dependent on continuous technological 
innovation, open trade and investment channels 
and non-confrontational relations with the Great 
Powers. To that end, Europe’s research and 
development capacity, education, strategic 
investments into key enabling technologies and 
value chains, the enforcement of fair 
competition, as well as reform of the WTO and 
deepening bi-/plurilateral cooperation are critical 
to a geoeconomic EU.  
But the reality of the thin line between protection 
and protectionism, between cost and benefit, 
between supporting and stifling innovation, 
cannot be an argument for the status quo ante 
either. Rather, it should be an argument for 
developing a strong framework for EU economic 
sovereignty that allows the Commission and MS 
to better manage the tension between openness 
and protection across different policies. On that 
basis, a geoeconomic EU could expand its 
promotion of rules, standards and international 
cooperation while also strengthening its resilience 
to economic coercion and reinforcing its role in 
emerging technology-security governance and 
diplomacy.  
 
RESILIENCE TO ECONOMIC 
The return of overt economic coercion as a 
favoured policy instrument in Washington and 
Beijing stands among the most visible denials of 
EU economic sovereignty. Take China’s threat to 
punish EU firms operating in China, should 
Huawei be excluded in Europe. Or the still-
looming threat of US tariffs on European cars 
and other goods. 13 Such coercive threats are at 
odds with the EU’s interest in upholding the 
principles of international trade rules and independent 
policymaking. Strengthening European resilience to 
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economic coercion by offering a credible 
deterrent and by signalling costs of retribution 
more directly are an important aspect of a 
geoeconomic EU.  
In trade policy, a recent reform proposal for the 
EU Enforcement Regulation was a step in the 
right direction. It will allow limited retaliatory 
trade sanctions in defence of EU rights even in 
the absence of multilateral dispute settlement 
(i.e., a WTO court-of-appeal ruling). 14 The Trade 
Barriers Regulation, meanwhile, allows the 
Commission to enforce (unilaterally) EU trade 
rights brought to its attention by EU business. 
But the Commission received little political or 
conceptual backup to use this instrument – which 
acts similarly to US Section 301 – more 
assertively in the face of a crumbling WTO 
dispute settlement, American coercion, or 
Chinese protectionism. The new Commission’s 
post of a Chief Enforcement Officer should, in 
accordance with MS, develop a methodology and 
communication strategy, signalling to third 
countries in a clear, consistent and credible 
manner the costs of unfair trade tariffs and 
barriers.  
In the financial realm, the US dollar’s centrality in 
the global financial network gives Washington 
unparalleled powers to choke off access to this 
network and sanction private actors via 
secondary sanctions. In the past year alone, 
European actors operating in Iran (Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action of JCPOA), Cuba 
(Helms-Burton) and the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream 
II) found themselves on the receiving end of US 
financial coercion or complied with demands in 
fear of sanctions.  
For secondary sanctions targeting EU private 
actors, the goal of decreasing the exposure to a 
weaponised US dollar should remain a long-term 
EU objective. The JCPOA episode and Europe’s 
ambition to keep Teheran committed to the deal 
after the US withdrawal demonstrated the EU’s 
vulnerability when transatlantic interests do not 
align. The INSTEX15 mechanism, which attempted to 
protect mainly humanitarian trade with Iran (e.g., 
food, medicine) from US secondary sanctions, 
did not really work. But even if INSTEX’s limited 
scope included the oil trade – the heart of the US 
sanctions regime – evasion from sanctions in a 
dollar-dominated global financial system is 
currently impractical (INSTEX and its customers 
themselves could be sanctioned; there is also the 
issue of overcompliance of private actors).  
In the long run, only strengthening the role of the 
euro as a geoeconomic-power tool by deepening 
structural, economic and monetary reforms (e.g., 
completion of the banking union; a common 
deposit insurance; financial service integration via 
capital markets union; a pan-Eurozone safe asset) 
is a viable strategy. 16 But in the short term, 
structures like INSTEX can raise (mainly) the 
political costs for Washington to impose 
sanctions and should thus receive sufficient 
backing from the EU and MS.  
 
TECHNOLOGY-SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
AND DIPLOMACY 
The US-China technological leadership 
competition has opened a fierce debate in 
Washington about regulatory control regimes 
around investments, supply chains and exports. 
Creating new rules and standards around the 
technology–security nexus will likely become a 
new form of transnational governance and 
diplomacy. It will be crucial for a geoeconomic 
EU in 2020 to retain its seat at the table and be 
able to co-influence these evolving structures 
according to European interests and values.  
The investment screening regulation and 5G 
process have been first steps for the EU in this 
new governance domain. But further questions 
arise: e.g., which other supply chains of critical 
technologies/infrastructure could be vulnerable 
to, for example, third-country control of key 
input suppliers? If we have identified 5G as one 
such vulnerable infrastructure, how do we go 
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about assessing EU supply-chain security more 
structurally and in closer coordination?  
While addressing such security issues remains a 
MS competence, an EU body comprising experts 
from the business, foreign policy and intelligence 
community could function as a coordination and 
information-sharing platform. Similar to the 
‘Economic Security’ divisions in Japan’s and the 
United States’ National Security Secretariat/Council, 
the body – absent a European Security Council – 
could analyse relevant information and plan 
strategic economic policy scenarios. Similar to the 
EU 5G report and toolbox, this exercise could 
develop common standards/methodologies for 
the assessment of EU supply-chain security on 
the basis of an EU economic sovereignty strategy.  
Meanwhile, export controls17 are gaining critical 
currency in Washington. While their scope and 
application remain contested and largely 
undecided in DC, Europe cannot afford to wait 
on the sideline for the results. Technological 
decoupling is not in Europe’s interest. The 
negative effects of broad-scope trade restrictions 
on Europe’s innovation capacity are likely to 
outweigh any security gains. Controls, if any, 
should thus be drawn as finely and narrowly as 
possible and clearly linked to technology with 
concrete implications for security.  
For the EU to be able to defend this interest, it 
must be a powerful broker in technology 
diplomacy. The current proposal for the 
modernisation of the EU export control regime, 
already adopted by the Commission in 2016, 
could advance a common EU position as a new 
baseline for EU action. But the proposal has not 
gained enough traction in the Council. Europe is 
already at the receiving end of fierce technology 
diplomacy (e.g., Washington campaign to block 
the sale of Dutch chip-manufacturing technology 
to China18 or Beijing throwing its weight behind 
the Huawei charm offensive in the EU). 19 If the 
MS are not to be ground up, the EU must be 
equipped with a common position and strategy.  
EU technology diplomacy should aim to build 
trust and cooperation in multilateral institutions, 
such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, OECD, 
G7/20, and international standards organisations, 
and plurilateral arrangements, such as the EU–
US–Japan Trilateral Agenda. Bilateral platforms, 
including the regulatory cooperation channels 
with the US, Japan, Australia or Canada should 
also be used as avenues. Integrating different 
diplomacy and regulatory streams that already 
exist with partner countries – such as on 
investment screening, export controls and 
technical standards cooperation – could provide 
new structures for economic, technology and 
security cooperation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The EU’s geoeconomic potential is significant. 
But power potential does not necessarily translate 
into power projection. Getting a geoeconomic 
EU right means ensuring continuous technological 
innovation, open trade and investment channels, 
a global level playing field and non-
confrontational relations with the Great Powers, 
while defining the rules and managing the risks 
from economic and technological interdependencies. 
An economic sovereignty strategy that develops 
a risk spectrum at the intersection of economics, 
technology and security and clearly positions 
European interests in the triangular relationship 
with Washington and Beijing would be a 
meaningful step towards that goal in 2020. 
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